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Résumé: Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les 
infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont par 
exemple des amendes, des primes d'assurance ou des permis à points. Nous analysons 
l'efficacité incitative de ces mécanismes. Nous obtenons leurs propriétés théoriques par 
rapport au nombre de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces 
propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement avec des données issues du système public 
d'assurance au Québec. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données, qui 
traduit le fait que les conducteurs qui accumulent les points deviennent plus prudents car ils 
sont plus sous risque de perdre leur permis. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points 
introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Nous utilisons ce résultat pour 
calculer des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les retraits de permis. 
 
Abstract: Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote 
safe driving. Examples of mechanisms are fines, experience rating and point-record driving 
licenses. We analyse the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We 
derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit 
points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance 
plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that drivers who accumulate demerit 
points become more careful because they are at threat of losing their license. The insurance 
rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use 
this result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions. 
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1 Introduction
Since the 1970s fatality rates due to road-tra¢ c accidents have decreased steadily
in developed countries, although risk exposure increased concomitantly (see
OECD, 2005). For example, over the last ten years, the road fatality rate de-
creased by forty percent in France. However, the implied social cost of road
accidents remains high (Doyle, 2005). A major reason for the improvement
of the situation in the OECD has been the development of incentives for safe
driving. Experience rating schemes used by the insurance industry have incen-
tive properties (see Boyer and Dionne, 1989; Abbring et al, 2003). They are
supplemented by point-record drivers licenses based on tra¢ c violations. In
many countries, each convicted tra¢ c o¤ense is led with a specic number of
demerit points. When the accumulated number of points exceeds a given thresh-
old, the drivers license is suspended. Point removal clauses are added so that
this penalty can be avoided in the long run.1 A point-record drivers license
was implemented in Quebec in 1978, together with a no-fault insurance plan for
bodily injuries which replaced a tort system.2 The road fatality rate decreased
by fty percent during the fteen years that followed.3
In Quebec, the Société de lAssurance Automobile du Quebec (referred to
as SAAQ below) is a public monopoly that provides coverage for bodily injury.
The SAAQ is also in charge of accident prevention and control, including the
management of drivers licenses. Before 1992, the rating structure for bodily
injury insurance was completely at. Since December 1, 1992, the public au-
thorities in Quebec have implemented an experience rating scheme based on
accumulated demerit points. This mechanism was added to other incentives,
i.e., nes, the point-record drivers license in force since 1978, and the private
sector insurance rating for coverages other than bodily injury.
This paper analyzes the incentive properties of nes, point-record drivers
licenses and experience rating based on tra¢ c violations. Studies on incentive
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mechanisms for road safety have appeared in the economic literature for many
years (Peltzman, 1975; Landes, 1982; Boyer and Dionne, 1987). In the presence
of asymmetric information, insurers use partial insurance or experience rating
to improve resource allocation. Both schemes have proved to be e¢ cient for
handling moral hazard and adverse selection. Empirical tests have measured the
e¤ectiveness of such mechanisms for road safety (Sloan et al, 1995; Boyer and
Dionne, 1989) and the presence of residual asymmetric information problems
in insurersportfolios (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Dionne, Gouriéroux and
Vanasse, 2001). More recently, Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) designed
a new test based on the dynamics of insurance contracts to detect the presence
of moral hazard. Their model makes it possible to separate the moral hazard
e¤ect on accidents from unobserved heterogeneity. They found no evidence of
moral hazard in the French car insurance market. The convex structure of
the French "bonus-malus" system is used to show that the optimal e¤ort level
exerted by a rational policyholder increases after a claim at fault. In our study,
insurance pricing is not the major incentive scheme but rather a measure used
to complement nes and the point-record drivers license. Moreover, the pricing
scheme of the Quebec public automobile insurance is an increasing step function
of past demerit points.
Insurance pricing may not su¢ ce as a tool for designing an optimal road
safety policy because it may not create the appropriate incentives for reckless
drivers (Sloan et al, 1995). Bourgeon and Picard (2007) show how point-record
drivers licenses provide incentives for road safety among normal drivers (those
who respond to the usual incentive schemes) when the judicial system or the
insurance market fail to provide optimal incentives. Point-record drivers li-
censes also allow the government to incapacitate reckless drivers because nes
for tra¢ c violations are bounded above in many jurisdictions. Bounded nes
exist for di¤erent reasons: 1) many o¤enders are judgment proof and are unable
to pay optimal nes; 2) many drivers are expected to escape from paying tickets
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issued by the authorities when nes are very high; 3) society thinks it is unfair
that rich and reckless drivers will pay high nes and continue to drive danger-
ously (Shavell, 1987a, 1987b). However, nes do reinforce the e¤ectiveness of
the point record mechanism by providing normal drivers with more incentives.
In Bourgeon and Picards model, which uses only two levels of prevention, the
optimal ne must be set at the maximal level and must be neither progressive
nor regressive. These authors also discuss the optimality of point removal mech-
anisms as a screening device. Public intervention can be justied when there is a
signicant di¤erence between the private and the social cost of human lives (Vis-
cusi, 1993). Finally, drivers may be unaware of their own accident or infraction
probabilities or may misunderstand some features of the incentive environment.
We present the data base in Section 2 as well as our rst empirical results
related to the introduction of the new pricing policy implemented in 1992. The
point-record mechanisms (drivers license suspensions and insurance pricing)
are described in Section 3 and their incentive properties are investigated in an
optimal behavior model in which time and e¤ort are continuous. If incentives are
caused by nes and by the point-record drivers license, we show that the optimal
e¤ort level increases globally with the number of demerit points accumulated and
decreases with the seniority of non-redeemed tra¢ c violations, if any. Tra¢ c
violation risk varies conversely, as it decreases with the e¤ort level.
These results are compared with the data in Section 4. The observed dy-
namics on the drivers result from the incentive e¤ects and from the revelation
with time of hidden features in risk distributions, i.e. an unobserved heterogene-
ity e¤ect. Let us compare these two e¤ects at the time and event (accident or
tra¢ c violation) level of the data dynamics. Drivers with more tra¢ c violations
committed during a given period are riskier with respect to hidden features in
risk distributions. Hence unobserved heterogeneity entails a risk reassessment
after each event, and the event e¤ect of risk revelation counters the correspond-
ing incentive e¤ect of the point-record drivers license. The revelation e¤ect on
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the risk level of a period without tra¢ c violations is negative.4 The time e¤ect
of unobserved heterogeneity is also converse to that of the incentive e¤ect, which
raises an identication issue in the interpretation of the observed dynamics on
the drivers. Abbring et als (2003) test for moral hazard can be used if there are
no time e¤ects in the incentives. Because the time e¤ects are important in Que-
becs point-record system, we use another approach. We test for an increasing
link between tra¢ c violation risk and the number of demerit points. Reject-
ing this assumption amounts to nding evidence of moral hazard (ab absurdo,
because of the increasing event e¤ect created by unobserved heterogeneity). In
Section 4.1, the incentives created by the threat of drivers license suspension
are found to increase with accumulated demerit points. These ndings conrm
the theoretical analysis.
The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of
tra¢ c violations by 15%. In Section 4.2, we link the incentive levels of the three
point-record mechanisms as derived from the theoretical analysis of Section 3
and the observed e¢ ciency of these mechanisms. Monetary equivalents for tra¢ c
violations and license suspensions are derived from this analysis. Conclusions
are drawn in Section 5 and technicalities are relegated to an appendix.
2 Presentation of the data base and prelimi-
nary empirical results
Our data base represents roughly one percent of the SAAQ portfolio. The panel
covers the period from January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1996. A rst sample of
40,000 license holders was selected at random at the beginning of 1983. About
300 young drivers were added each following year.5 The attrition rate per year
is close to 1.5%, which is very low compared with the private sector. Due to
the monopolistic status of the SAAQ, leaving the company means that drivers
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lose their license, which explains the low attrition rate. The endogenous attri-
tion is not very high. It was estimated from a bivariate probit model on tra¢ c
o¤enses and departures from the sample. A score test for the nullity of the
correlation coe¢ cient between the two equations6 was performed with the re-
gression components set used in Section 4. The null hypothesis was not rejected
at a ve percent signicance level. Hence the attrition risk adds no signicant
information to the assessment of tra¢ c violation risk.
The personal characteristics of each driver are available on the drivers
license for the current period. These characteristics are used as regression com-
ponents in the empirical study. Several types of events are recorded in the data
base; they are listed below with related variables in addition to the date. 1)
Accidents that have led to a police report. Only those with bodily injury are
compensated by the SAAQ. 2) Convicted violations of the Highway Safety Code,
together with the number of demerit points used in the point-record mechanisms.
The number of demerit points is based on the severity of the tra¢ c violation.
Their distribution is given in Section 3.4. 3) Drivers license suspensions, which
are spells rather than events, and 4) Premium payments, which since the 1992
reform are related to accumulated demerit points. These payments are made
every two years on the policyholders birthday.
Between 1985 and 1996, the average yearly frequencies of accidents with
bodily injuries, accidents of all types (not including joint reports led with
private insurers) and tra¢ c violations are equal to 1.4%, 6.7% and 16.9% re-
spectively. Figure 1 represents the relative frequencies derived from a one year
centered moving average.7
Insert Figure 1 about here
There is an overall decline in the frequency of accidents, whereas the fre-
quency of tra¢ c violations remains more stationary. This may seem surprising,
but it is explained by the evolution of the tra¢ c control environment. For in-
stance, the number of tra¢ c control devices such as radars increased during the
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1980s and 1990s. An increase in the rate of tra¢ c o¤enses recorded by devices
or police o¢ cers among those committed explains this relationship. Figure 1
shows evidence of several periods where the frequency of tra¢ c violations in-
creased along with opposite variations in the frequencies of accidents. A step-up
in tra¢ c control during these periods may well explain such observations.
A tra¢ c violation committed by a driver must be selected twice in order
to be led with demerit points. It must rst be recorded by a control device
or a police o¢ cer. We already mentioned that the related selection rate had
previously increased. Second, the o¤ender must be convicted of the recorded
tra¢ c violation. The ling of a tra¢ c violation is somewhat discretionary. Since
the 1992 reform for instance, drivers are being forced to pay more in premiums
given demerit points, and we might expect policemen to be more hesitant to
hand them out, and to give warnings instead.8 The conviction rate is less likely
to vary with time than the recording rate.
In Figure 1, a downturn is also observed in the frequency of tra¢ c viola-
tions just before the date (December 1, 1992) of the reform that introduced the
experience rating structure based on demerit points. The reform was announced
in August 1, 1992, which may explain why the downturn starts slightly before
December 1, 1992. The experience-rated premium was rst applied at the con-
tract anniversary following December 1, 1992 and used the complete two year
history of demerit points. Hence the new incentives for safe driving took e¤ect
for most of the drivers at August 1, 1992 (i.e. drivers with their next birthday
after December 1, 1992).9 On average, the annual frequency of tra¢ c violations
was equal to 17.6% before the reform and 15.4% afterwards, which corresponds
to a 12.5% decrease. The 1992 reform can be interpreted as a laboratory exper-
iment to test whether experience rating based on demerit points reduces tra¢ c
violations. Nonetheless, the lower rate of tra¢ c violations following the 1992
Quebec reform may be due to the changes in other factors that inuence driver
behavior. Identifying the inuence of these factors necessitates a control group
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that is not a¤ected by the policy change. Unfortunately, we do not have access
to such a control group because the insurer is a monopoly and bodily injury
insurance is compulsory.10 In Section 4.2, we shall link the average decrease in
the frequency of tra¢ c violations before and after the 1992 reform to the overall
e¤ectiveness of incentive schemes.
Monetary and non-monetary incentives for safe driving are based on tra¢ c
violations as well as the optimal behavior models presented in Section 3. How-
ever the actual social cost of road tra¢ c is caused by accidents. To reconcile
these two approaches, two results are worth mentioning. First, demerit points
are good predictors of accidents. This is well documented in the literature and is
conrmed on our data in Section 4.1. Second, the global stationarity of convicted
tra¢ c violation frequency observed in Figure 1 concurs with a probable decrease
in the frequency of committed tra¢ c violations (see the aforementioned devel-
opments on selection rates). Lowering tra¢ c violation risk through point-record
mechanisms should also lower accident risk and the related social cost.
Finally, Figure 1 shows that accidents with bodily injuries evolve in much
the same way as those recorded in the SAAQ le. We include accidents of all
types in the empirical analysis in order to obtain more stable results.11
3 Incentive e¤ects of point-record mechanisms
3.1 Point-record mechanisms in Quebec
In this section, we describe Quebecs point-record mechanisms which are based
on tra¢ c violations, both monetary (insurance premiums) and non-monetary
(point-record drivers license). Comparisons are made with respect to the mech-
anisms used by other countries.12 We investigate the incentive properties of
point-record mechanisms in Sections 3.2 to 3.4.
In many countries, drivers license suspensions are based on demerit points.
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In Quebec, demerit points are assigned to convictions for tra¢ c o¤enses, and
their number depends on the tra¢ c violation severity. When the accumulated
number of demerit points reaches or exceeds a given threshold, the drivers
license is suspended. Before January 1990 this threshold was set at twelve in
Quebec and has since been increased to fteen.
In order to mitigate the social cost of license suspensions, point removal
systems exist for most real-world point-record drivers licenses. In Quebec, the
demerit points related to a given driving o¤ense are removed after two years.
Hence, drivers license suspensions depend on the demerit points recorded during
the last two years. Most of point removal systems used by American states
follow the same approach. The average number of demerit points per convicted
o¤ense is 2.4 in Quebec. It takes about six tra¢ c violations within two years
to trigger a license suspension, an unlikely outcome when the annual tra¢ c
violation frequency is 16.9%. However, the heterogeneity of risks is high and a
point-record drivers license is also an incapacitating device for risky and reckless
drivers through the license suspensions. Another point removal system consists
in cancelling all the demerit points after a given period of violation-free driving.
This mechanism was recently implemented in Spain, with a two year seniority.
The French drivers license uses the two point removal systems.
The experience rating structure introduced by the SAAQ in December 1,
1992 links each premium paid every two years to the demerit points accumulated
over the previous two years. The rating structure is given in Section 3.4. Once
the premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with a fresh zero point record.
Thus the length of the record relevant to the derivation of optimal behavior
never exceeds two years.
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3.2 Basic model for a point-record drivers license with-
out point removal
Bourgeon and Picard (2007) analyze the incentive e¤ects of point-record drivers
licenses. Their model uses a binary e¤ort variable. We extend their approach
with a continuous e¤ort level. Hence the e¤ectiveness of e¤ort may also be a
continuous function of contract time, a desirable property for empirical valida-
tion. We show that under fairly general conditions, a rational policyholders safe
driving e¤ort will increase with the number of demerit points accumulated.
We assume that the drivers license is revoked when the driver reaches
a total of N demerit points. For the sake of simplicity, each convicted tra¢ c
violation is linked to one supplementary demerit point in this section. A driver
with a suspended drivers license is reinstated after a period D with a fresh zero-
point record like that of a beginner.13 The durationD may be xed or random in
the model. In Quebec, a license suspension is of random length because drivers
must pass a new exam after a given period before recovering their license.14 A
rational driver maximizes his expected lifetime utility expressed in $ and derived
from:
 An instantaneous driving utility, du.
 A time-dependent disutility of e¤ort, denoted as e(t).15 This e¤ort level
is linked to an instantaneous tra¢ c violation frequency risk, denoted as
(e(t)). The hazard function (e) corresponds to a probability p(e) in
static or discrete time incentive models, and is assumed to be a positive,
decreasing and strictly convex function of the e¤ort level.
In this section, we suppose that there is no point removal mechanism. In
that case, the lifetime expected utility (we assume an innite horizon) depends
only on the number n of accumulated demerit points, and is denoted as un. The
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Bellman equation on the expected utility leads to
un =
du
r
  c(un   un+1)
r
; (0  n < N); (1)
where r is a subjective discount rate, and where c is dened as follows
c(u) =
def
min
e0
e+ [(e)u] : (2)
Technical details can be found in Appendix A.1. From equation (2), incen-
tives are e¤ective if we have u >  1=0(0). In this equation, u is the lifetime
utility loss between the current state and the one reached after an additional
tra¢ c o¤ense. Once quantied, u is the monetary equivalent of this tra¢ c vio-
lation. Values of this type are derived in Section 4.2. The function c minimizes
the sum e + [(e)u] ; which is the disutility ow of both e¤ort (short-term
component) and the expected lifetime utility loss (long-term component). All
the un are lower than umax = du=r, the private lifetime driving utility without
the point-record drivers license. Equation (1) means that c(un   un+1)=r is
the minimal private utility cost of the point-record mechanism for a driver with
n demerit points. The cycle of lifetime utilities is closed with a link between
u0 and uN , the lifetime expected utility just after the suspension of the drivers
license. For instance, if the private disutility of drivers license suspension is
only the loss of driving utility during a period D, we have that
uN = u0;  = E[exp( rD)]: (3)
The utilities are then derived from the recurrence equations (1) and (3). Opti-
mal e¤ort depends on the variation of lifetime utility u because it minimizes
the function dened in equation (2). The variable u (the argument of c in
equation (2)) which determines optimal e¤ort will be referred to later as the
incentive level. In this setting, optimal e¤ort depends on the number n of ac-
cumulated demerit points but not on time, and we denote it as en. It is shown
in Appendix A.1 that en increases with n for any given value of N . The related
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frequency of violations n = (en) thus decreases with n. The intuition behind
this result is the following. A given reduction in tra¢ c violation risk is more ef-
cient as the threat of the license suspension gets closer. Hence the e¢ ciency of
e¤ort increases with the number of demerit points accumulated, and we obtain
an increasing link between this number and the optimal e¤ort level. A parallel
can be drawn with the "three strikes and youre out" rule enforced in California
to deter crime. The deterrence e¤ect increases from one to two strikes (Helland
and Tabarrok, 2007).16
Fines represent another monetary incentive scheme applied in Quebec
throughout the period investigated in this study. Let us denote fa as the av-
erage ne for a tra¢ c violation conviction. Given that nes and premiums are
low in comparison to average wealth, risk aversion is not signicant. If nes are
combined with the preceding point-record drivers license, the incentive level is
equal to fa+un un+1. This means that the average ne is added to the utility
loss in the variable which determines optimal e¤ort. Besides, the optimal e¤ort
still increases with n for a given value of the average ne.
3.3 Point-record drivers licenses with point removal
In Quebec, each tra¢ c violation is redeemed at the end of a two-year period.
Integrating this feature in the optimal behavior model is di¢ cult, because all the
seniorities of non-redeemed driving o¤enses must be included as state variables
in the dynamic programming equations. Lifetime utility is expected to increase
with time for a given number of demerit points accumulated. Optimal e¤ort
depends on the di¤erence between the present utility and a substitute utility
(i.e., that reached after an additional tra¢ c violation). With the point removal
system in force in Quebec, the substitute utility increases with time as does
the present utility. Time should have more value for worse situations, which
implies that the substitute utility should increase faster than the present utility.
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Optimal e¤ort should thus decrease with time. Appendix A.2 provides proof
that optimal e¤ort is continuous at the time of a point removal. Optimal e¤ort
is then expected to increase with each tra¢ c violation in order to compensate
for the decreasing link between time and e¤ort. To summarize, we expect the
e¤ort level to increase globally with the number of demerit points accumulated
and to decrease with the seniority of non-redeemed tra¢ c violations, if any.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the optimal tra¢ c violation risk during
a period that includes two violations and their point removal. The continuous
time e¤ect of incentives balances the downward jump in risk after each violation.
The incentive e¤ects at the time and event level are the opposite of those created
by the revelation of unobserved heterogeneity. The incentive properties of the
point removal system in force in Quebec are similar to those of a mechanism
without point removal as regards the number of demerit points accumulated.
In Section 4, we will use the model of Section 3.2 as a proxy for the incentive
environment in Quebec.
3.4 Incentive e¤ects of premiums indexed on demerit
points: The example of Quebec
Table 1 presents the rating structure enforced for each drivers license on the
rst contract anniversary following December 1, 1992. The premium paid every
two years after this date depends on the number of demerit points accumulated
in the last two years. It does not represent the total premium for bodily injury
insurance but rather the additional premium related to demerit points. This
average premium is equal to $54.60, and complements a yearly drivers license
fee for insurance coverage equal to $107.
Insert Table 1 about here
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In this section, the incentive properties of this rating structure are analyzed
separately from the point-record drivers license. An important input is the
distribution of demerit points for a given driving o¤ense, which we left out in
Section 3.2. Denoting fj as the proportion of tra¢ c violations with j demerit
points, we have the following values
f1 = 4:71%; f2 = 52:32%; f3 = 38:34%; f4 = 2:83%; f5 = 1:80%: (4)
Note that f5 actually refers to o¤enses with ve points and more. Table 1
shows that the premium is a step function of the accumulated demerit points.
Because of the local non-convexity of the premium, the incentives may not always
increase with the number of demerit points accumulated. Consider, for instance,
a policyholder just before her contract anniversary. The incentive level will
be stronger with two accumulated demerit points than with four. With four
points, it is indeed less than likely that the next tra¢ c o¤ense will trigger an
increase in premium. The corresponding probability is 2:83+1:80 = 4:63%, if we
assume that the distribution of the fj is independent of the accumulated demerit
points. The incentives for safe driving are stronger at a two point level because
the probability of climbing a step in the rating structure after a tra¢ c o¤ense
is close to one. The aforementioned result is in contrast to that obtained by
Abbring et al (2003) for the French "bonus-malus" scheme and its exponential
structure. Hence, step pricing schemes may have poor incentive properties. They
are employed because they are simple.
Let us design an optimal behavior model based on this rating structure.
Once the premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with a fresh zero point record.
Hence the optimal control model can be designed with the next contract an-
niversary as the horizon. Let n be the premium paid for n demerit points
accumulated during a period of T = 2 years between two contract anniversaries.
As we disregard the point-record drivers license and its possible deprivation,
the driving utility is no longer a parameter. However, we retain nes in the in-
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centives for safe driving. We denote vn(t) as the expected disutility of premiums
and nes paid until the next contract anniversary, where t is the seniority of the
last anniversary and n is the number of demerit points accumulated since that
date. We have the terminal conditions
vn(T ) = n; 8n = 0; : : : ; N: (5)
If incentives are related to nes and insurance premiums, the incentive
level is the sum of the average ne fa and of the expected variation of vn(t)
after a tra¢ c o¤ense (see Appendix A.3). Hence optimal e¤ort is determined
by fa+vn(t), with vn(t) =
P
j = fj>0
fj vmin(n+j;N)(t)

  vn(t): Derivations
show that the average of vn(t) with respect to n does not vary much with
time. The terminal values of vn are derived from equations (4), (5) and Table
1. For n = 0; 2; 4; we obtain
v0(T ) = $2:32; v2(T ) = $47:65; v4(T ) = $3:43: (6)
The incentives with two points accumulated are much stronger than with four
points, which conrms the analysis following equation (4). The overall average
of vn(t) with respect to t and n is close to $12, a 9% increase for an $130
average ne. In Section 4.2, this increase will be compared with the variation in
tra¢ c violation frequency before and after the reform.
4 Empirical results on the incentive e¤ects of
point-record mechanisms
4.1 Point-record drivers license
In this section, we analyze the data before the 1992 reform that introduced
the experience rating scheme based on demerit points. Thus the point-record
drivers license interacts only with nes. Regressions are performed from January
14
1985 (we need a two year history to derive the accumulated demerit points)
to December 1992, the date of the reform enforcement. We try to conrm the
theoretical ndings of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 (i.e., the e¤ort level increases globally
with the number of demerit points accumulated and decreases with the seniority
of non-redeemed tra¢ c violations, if any), and to nd evidence of moral hazard
in the data.
We estimate the hazard functions of convicted tra¢ c o¤enses and accidents
with a proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). We retained the following spec-
ication
ji (t) = exp(
 
xi(t)j

+ gj(adpi(t))) hSi(t)j (ci(t)): (7)
In equation (7), ji (t) is the hazard function of type j (j = 1 : tra¢ c violation
or j = 2 : accident) for driver i at calendar time t. Regression components
are denoted by the line-vector xi(t). We retained the gender, drivers license
class, place of residence, age of the driver, calendar e¤ects related to years and
months, and the number of past license suspensions.17 The number of demerit
points accumulated in the last two years is denoted as adpi(t): Let us comment
the expected shape of g1; which links tra¢ c violation risk to accumulated demerit
points. The revelation e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity is increasing in adp,
and is converse to the incentive e¤ect. In the absence of moral hazard, g1 should
then be increasing. We will test the null hypothesis that g1 is weakly increasing
against the alternative that it is not (i.e. g1 strictly decreases for at least some
values). Rejecting the null amounts to nding evidence of moral hazard.18
E¤ort is expected to decrease with time only if the number of demerit
points accumulated is greater than zero. Hence we specied a stratied propor-
tional hazards model.19 The baseline hazard functions hSi(t)j depend on the risk
type j and on the stratum Si(t). There are two strata, depending on whether
the variable adpi(t) is equal to zero or not. Lastly, contract time ci(t) is inte-
grated into the baseline hazard function hj. The function ci is set at zero at the
beginning of the whole period. Then it is reset to zero at each event that trig-
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gers a variation of the accumulated demerit points (i.e., tra¢ c violation or point
removal). This event-driven operation should eliminate interactions between
calendar and contract-time e¤ects for the stratum associated with adp > 0.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 shows that bg1 is increasing until adp reaches the seven point thresh-
old, at which point the increasing property is no longer fullled, and bg1 reaches
a maximum at seven points. It is worth mentioning that the SAAQ warns the
policyholders when their accumulated demerit points increase beyond a seven
point threshold.20 When the accumulated demerit points are less than or equal
to seven, the unobserved heterogeneity e¤ects outweigh the incentive e¤ects
because bg1 is increasing. Controlling for other covariates, a driver with seven ac-
cumulated demerit points is exp(0:974) = 2:65 times riskier than a driver with
a violation-free record. Hence unobserved heterogeneity e¤ects strongly out-
weigh incentives to drive carefully between zero and seven points. This result
is reversed beyond seven points. For instance, a driver with seven accumulated
demerit points that gets a supplementary two point o¤ense has a tra¢ c viola-
tion risk that is 19% lower. As the unobserved heterogeneity e¤ect is increasing
with adp, the estimated risk reduction due to the incentive e¤ect is greater than
19%. A 20% value for the risk reduction after a tra¢ c o¤ense will be retained
in the next section, in order to derive monetary equivalents for tra¢ c violations
and license suspensions. Table 2 presents tests where the null assumption is
g1(7)  g1(adp); for adp > 7. The null is rejected for these values of adp at
signicance levels greater than 1:3%, except for adp = 11: We also performed a
global test on the weakly increasing shape of g1: The test statistic is a squared
distance between the unconstrained estimation of g1 given in Table 2, and the
set of weakly increasing functions of adp (see Appendix A.4 for more details).
A graphical illustration is given in Figure 3. We reject the increasing shape
assumption for every usual signicance level. As an absence of incentive e¤ects
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entails an increasing shape for g1 (unobserved heterogeneity e¤ect), rejecting the
null shows evidence of moral hazard.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Table 2 shows less evidence of moral hazard on accident risk than on tra¢ c
violation risk, as the estimation of g2 increases until adp = 10. A possible
interpretation is that we cannot separate at fault from no-fault accidents. In the
literature, the incentive e¤ect is usually higher with at fault accidents. Besides,
drivers nearing the license suspension threshold might also apply opportunistic
strategies regarding tra¢ c violations (e.g. paying more attention to radars)
without otherwise modifying their attitude towards road tra¢ c risk.
The estimated hazard functions from the tra¢ c violation equation globally
decrease with time, including the one related to the stratum adp > 0.21 This
means that the continuous time e¤ect created by the revelation of unobserved
heterogeneity outweighs the incentive e¤ects (see Figure 2 and the discussion
that follows). This is not surprising, given that the average increase of g1 in
Table 2 (a vast majority of drivers have less than seven demerit points) must be
balanced by a negative time e¤ect in order to obtain stationary risk levels on
average.
4.2 Incentive e¤ects of the 1992 reform and monetary
equivalents for tra¢ c violations and license suspen-
sions
In this section, we assess the e¢ ciency of the 1992 reform. We compare its
incentive level to those of nes and of the point-record drivers license. We
relate the e¢ ciency of the reform to its relative weight in the three incentive
mechanisms, and we infer results on the shape of the link between the cost and
e¢ ciency of e¤ort. Lastly, we derive monetary equivalents for tra¢ c violations
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and license suspensions, from the estimated e¢ ciency of incentives created by a
supplementary tra¢ c violation.
In Section 2, we mentioned a 12.5% decrease in the average frequency of
tra¢ c violations before and after the reform which introduced the experience
rating structure based on demerit points. This result changes slightly if we
control with the regression components used in Table 2. A regression estimated
from 1985 to 1996 with the covariates of Section 4.1 and a dummy related to the
period following December 1, 1992 associates the reform with a 15% decrease.22
The results of Section 3.4 (for instance equation (6)) suggest that the number
of demerit points accumulated since the last anniversary should inuence the
e¤ectiveness of the 1992 reform. However, we did not obtain signicant results in
this direction. The driverslimited knowledge of the environment could explain
this poor result, a point developed later.
We perform an overall comparison of the three incentive schemes. We use
the model without point removal of Section 3.2 to analyze the incentives for
drivers in Quebec. Before the 1992 reform, nes were supplemented by a point-
record drivers license. Optimal e¤ort after n non-redeemed tra¢ c violations
depends on the incentive level, i.e. the argument of the function c dened in
equation (2). This level is equal to fa+un un+1 (see Section 3.2). The average
ne fa is equal to $130, and the 1992 reform entails an average increase in the
incentive level equal to $12 from Section 3.4. At this point, it seems interesting
to relate optimal frequency risk and the incentive level. This relation can be
assessed from the elasticity between the former and the latter variable. When
the incentives are e¤ective, it can be shown that this elasticity is less than  1
if and only if log() is a concave function of e¤ort (elasticity and concavity are
considered locally: see Appendix A.5 for a proof). A global elasticity equal
to  1 is linked to an exponential decay of . With (e) = (0)  exp( e),
the optimal risk level as a function of fa +u (the incentive level) is equal to
1=( (fa+u)) if the incentives are e¤ective.
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We now apply this result to the 1992 reform. As the reform entailed a
signicant reduction in tra¢ c violation risk regardless of the number of demerit
points accumulated, we can assume that incentives are e¤ective for a representa-
tive driver.23 This leads us to analyze the elasticity between tra¢ c violation risk
and the incentive level. Suppose that we leave out the modications of incentive
levels due to the aggregation of incentive mechanisms. Then we can relate:
 On the one hand, a 15% reduction in the frequency of tra¢ c violations
since the 1992 reform.
 On the other hand, a relative increase in the incentive level ranging be-
tween 9% and 10%. Indeed, the 1992 reform entails a $12 average increase
in the incentive level. This increase supplements the other components of
the incentives, i.e., the $130 average ne and the utility variation for the
point-record drivers license. In Table 2, the point-record drivers license
o¤ers signicant incentives beyond a seven point threshold, a result cor-
responding to only a minority of drivers (1.4%). The contribution of the
point-record drivers license to the incentives is low as compared with that
of nes.
This suggests that the elasticity between the optimal frequency risk and the
incentive level is less than -1 in this case. This result is linked to a locally concave
shape of log() for the representative driver. However external e¤ects could also
explain the reduction in the frequency of tra¢ c violations. We cannot eliminate
these e¤ects because there is no control group that is not a¤ected by the reform.
Besides, the elasticity would be modied if the distribution of demerit points for
a given driving o¤ense (see equation (4)) was wrongly perceived by the drivers.
The $12 contribution of the reform to the incentive level is low, because of the
high frequency of drivers without demerit points since the last birthday (87%),
and the low incentive level of the reform for these drivers (see equation (6)). This
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level depends largely on the probability of moving up a step in the premium
schedule after an additional tra¢ c violation, which must be associated with
four demerit points or more. If the perceived frequency of corresponding tra¢ c
violations was greater than the actual one (i.e., f4 + f5 = 2:83 + 1:80 = 4:63%),
the variation of the incentive level induced by the reform would increase. In
that case the elasticity would be closer to zero.
Lastly, let us assess monetary equivalents for a tra¢ c violation and a license
suspension. The monetary equivalent of a tra¢ c violation is the component of
the incentive level related to the point-record drivers license. It is equal to the
loss of lifetime utility after a tra¢ c violation, which depends on the number of
tra¢ c violations accumulated. A value can be derived from the e¤ectiveness of
e¤ort estimated in Table 2 and from the aforementioned link between e¢ ciency
of e¤ort and the incentive level. An additional tra¢ c violation beyond seven
accumulated demerit points entails a reduction of tra¢ c violation frequency of
close to 20%. Although these drivers cannot be seen as representative, we will
apply the elasticity derived from the preceding developments. If the 9% increase
in the incentive level induced by the 1992 reform entails a 15% reduction in
the frequency of tra¢ c violations, a 20% decrease in tra¢ c violation frequency
is associated with a 12% increase in the incentive level. The implied loss of
lifetime utility depends on the tra¢ c violation frequency risk  but mostly on
the discount rate r (see Appendix A.6). With  = 0:15, the monetary equiv-
alent of an additional tra¢ c violation for these drivers belongs to the interval
[$120; $195] if r = 3%, and to [$41:1; $55:7] if r = 6%. Besides, the growth
rate of this monetary equivalent with respect to the number n of non-redeemed
tra¢ c violations falls between r=n and r=n+1; where n is the optimal traf-
c violation frequency related to n. Monetary costs for license suspensions are
then obtained by adding the costs of tra¢ c violations until the crossing of the
demerit point threshold. Starting from a zero-point record and assuming that
six tra¢ c violations are needed to trigger a license suspension, the monetary
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cost of a license suspension is bounded by $700 and $1178 if r = 3%; and if
0 = 0:17; 1 = 0:17; 2 = 0:16; 3 = 0:15; 4 = 0:12; 5 = 0:09.24 A mis-
perception of the environment could modify the monetary equivalents of tra¢ c
violations and license suspensions. In the discussion on the elasticity between
the optimal frequency risk and the incentive level, we argued that an overesti-
mation of the frequency of severe tra¢ c violations would increase the perceived
incentive e¤ect of the 1992 reform. The $12 average e¤ect of the reform on the
incentive level should then be upgraded, and the monetary equivalents of tra¢ c
violations and license suspensions should also be upgraded.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we analyze the properties of policies designed to promote safe
driving. Three important incentive mechanisms for road safety are used in Que-
bec. When the Quebec government introduced a no-fault insurance regime in
1978, it implemented a point-record driving license to maintain incentives for
road safety. Because prevention activities are not observable by the public in-
surer, the new mechanism uses driversaccumulated demerit points to approxi-
mate past safety activities and to increase incentives to reduce infractions. Under
moral hazard, drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful be-
cause they are at threat of losing their license. This result was conrmed from
the data. Otherwise, we would have accepted an increasing link assumption
between accumulated demerit points and tra¢ c violation risk.
Fines are on average the most e¢ cient device, but they are associated to a
uniform incentive level. We designed our incentive models with a representative
driver, but there is of course heterogeneity in the individual parameters, such as
the threshold beyond which the incentives are e¤ective. We did not have wealth
variables at hand, and an interesting empirical issue would have been to cross
such variables with a reform dummy in risk assessment.
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The experience-rated premium based on accumulated demerit points is
a monetary point-record mechanism. The empirical results exhibit a rather
uniform e¤ectiveness after its enforcement in 1992, i.e. a 15% decrease in the
frequency of tra¢ c violations. Its incentive e¤ects do not strictly increase with
the accumulated demerit points, however, because of the steps in the rating
structure. The actual incentive e¤ect of the reform looks more like that induced
by an increase in the average ne. The SAAQ modied its rating policy in 2008,
with a premium increase from the rst demerit point.
Regulations are not self-enforcing. To successfully achieve a reform, the
regulator must implement enforcement activities and bear the costs thereof. In
our application to road safety, the Police is the most important enforcer of the
di¤erent incentive schemes. Police o¢ cers have a limited capacity to modify the
penalties for a given infraction but may a¤ect the detection probabilities based
on the aggregate convictions cycles, the drivers accumulated demerit points or
other tasks. When analyzing our results, we must consider the e¤ect of these
potential behaviors. For example, is it possible that when accumulated demerit
points are greater in a given le, police o¢ cers have an incentive to issue them
more or less often because of risk of the drivers losing his license.
We did not have precise information to control for these factors. It is
well documented that the Police collaborates very well with the Quebec public
insurer and Government. There is consequently a low probability that aggregate
safety scores would have a¤ected the Police behavior without the agreement of
the Government, which is assumed to be fully committed to its road safety
policies. Regarding the e¤ect of accumulated demerit points, we do not believe
there is a general policy in the Police force on the behavior to adopt based on
driverspast experience although some individuals may modify their behavior
in one direction or the other. This e¤ect is implicitly considered as a purely
random e¤ect in our analysis and should not have a¤ected our results on the
point record incentives.
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In this study we have not examined the long-term evolution of accidents
in detail, because we did not have access to the control variables of interest. In
recent years, many road safety initiatives have had an impact on accidents but
did not necessarily have any e¤ect on violations. These initiatives include mea-
sures such as occasional campaigns to prevent fatal accidents, increased police
patrols to reduce speeding and designated driver campaigns to prevent drinkers
from getting behind the wheel. The decline in deaths and serious injuries can
also be explained by vehicular improvements and the wearing of seat belts. All
such measures are complementary to those studied in this article.
Notes
1These clauses and their incentive properties are detailed in Section 3.
2The North American continent preceded Europe in the design of such systems. Point-
record drivers licenses were introduced in 1947 in the USA. Germany, France, and Spain
implemented these mechanisms in 1974, 1992 and 2005, respectively.
3We do not have information on factors di¤erent from the incentive schemes analyzed
in this article that might have explained this decrease. This study is performed in a no-fault
environment. For a recent comparison of strict liability and a negligence rule for risk-incentives
trade-o¤, see Fagart and Fluet (2009).
4Increases in premium after an event and "no claims discount" clauses observed in non-life
insurance can be explained by the revelation e¤ect of unobserved heterogeneity.
5Selecting at random one percent of the new license holders every year would evidently
have been a preferable sampling procedure. One thousand new license holders would then
have been selected every year, as the entry rate in the SAAQ portfolio is close to 2.5%.
6Binary variables related to tra¢ c o¤enses and attrition were created on a monthly basis,
and explained with the covariates used in Section 4.1. The score test statistic is equal to 0.34.
Hence we do not reject the nullity of the correlation coe¢ cient at the usual signicance levels.
7We begin in 1985 in order to match the regressions that follow, because a two-year history
is needed to obtain the accumulated demerit points. Data are rst averaged over one year,
to account for strong seasonal e¤ects. A centered moving average derived on ve fortnights is
then performed twice in order to reduce the volatility of the series.
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8We thank a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
9The SAAQ had the information on the driverstra¢ c violation history since 1978. Drivers
with a contract anniversary falling between the announcement of the reform and its enforce-
ment are not incited by the experience-rated premium before this anniversary. Incentives
exist otherwise (for these drivers after their birthday, and for all the other drivers since the
announcement of the reform). A referee suggested using this natural experiment in order to
disentangle the incentive e¤ects of the reform from calendar e¤ects. We did not obtain signif-
icant results. Four months is a short period, and on average only one driver out of twelve was
not incited by the rating scheme during the period.
10See Manning et al (1987) for the use of a control group in the assessment of a cost sharing
modication in the health insurance market.
11Important variables in the regressions such as the number of accumulated demerit points
have low frequencies for the highest values. It is hard to make an accurate estimation if the
frequency of events is low, as is the case for accidents with bodily injury.
12We focus on license suspensions in the comparisons. However nancial penalties are also
associated with demerit points in some American states.
13This reinstatement can be seen as a removal of demerit points. In the present paper, we
consider a point removal mechanism to be a cancellation of demerit points applied before the
suspension of the drivers license.
14The failure rate at the rst exam after the license suspension is 25%.
15Safe driving e¤ort can also reduce the expected disutility of accidents. If e ! (e) is
the implied decrease in the disutility ow, replacing e by e   (e) in the model includes the
inuence of safe driving e¤ort on accident disutility.
16We thank a referee for suggesting this connection. A "strike" is a conviction for a serious
felony, the equivalent of a demerit point. Three strikes entail a prison sentence of 25 years to
life, which in our context would be the license suspension. Comparing the time to rearrest
for criminals with one or two strikes in California, the authors conclude that those with two
strikes are less risky than those convicted twice, with one strike only. They thus observe an
increase in the deterrence e¤ect at the second strike.
17Comprehensive regressions based on two-year periods can be found in Dionne, Maurice,
Pinquet, and Vanasse (2001).
18We thank a referee for suggesting this formulation of the test.
19Stratication in a proportional hazards model means that Cox likelihoods (of a multino-
mial logit type) are derived for each stratum and then multiplied together. In other words, an
individual with an observed event is assumed to have competed only with other individuals
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in the same stratum and at risk at the same date. However, the same coe¢ cients for the
covariates are used across all strata.
20Drivers are not informed when o¤enses are redeemed.
21Results are available from the authors upon request.
22We retained the covariates used in Table 2 except for dummies related to calendar e¤ects
and to the number of past license suspension spells. The estimated parameter for the reform
dummy is equal to -0.163, and the related standard deviation is equal to 0.008. Hence the
reform e¤ect is conclusive at the usual tests signicance levels.
23From Section 3.2, a su¢ cient condition to have this result is that the average ne is higher
than the threshold  1=0(0) beyond which the incentives are e¤ective.
24These values correspond to an e¤ort level that increases with the number of demerit points
accumulated.
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 TABLE 1.—SAAQ INSURANCE PREMIUMS FOR BODILY INJURY AS A FUNCTION 
OF ACCUMULATED DEMERIT POINTS SINCE THE LAST CONTRACT ANNIVERSARY 
Accumulated demerit points 
(last two years) 
Premium for the next 
two years (Canadian $) 
Frequency 
(%) 
0,1,2,3  50  93.7 
4,5,6,7  100  4.9 
8,9,10,11  174  1.1 
12,13,14  286  0.2 
15 and more  398  0.1 
 
   Notes:  The  premium  is  a  step  function  of  accumulated  demerit  points.  The  incentives  for  safe 
driving depend on the accumulated demerit points. For example, we document  in the text that the 
incentive  level  is  stronger  with  two  accumulated  demerit  points  than  with  four  because  the 
probability of climbing a step in the rating structure after a traffic violation is higher. 
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 TABLE 2.—ESTIMATION OF THE HAZARD FUNCTION FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
AND ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RISKS 
Variable  Level 
Frequency 
(%) 
Traffic violation 
risk (g1) 
P‐value (H0: 
( ) ( )1 1g 7 g ,≤ adp  
adp > 7) 
Accident 
risk (g2) 
0 point (*)  76.60  0    0 
1 point   0.39  0.311    0.243 
2 points  9.36  0.500    0.328 
3 points  6.23  0.522    0.449 
adp: 
Number of 
accumulated 
demerit points 
(last two years) 
4 points  1.92  0.794    0.496 
  5 points  2.09  0.854    0.595 
  6 points  1.25  0.873    0.647 
  7 points  0.72  0.974    0.601 
  8 points  0.55  0.876  0.0130  0.736 
  9 points  0.43  0.764  < 0.0001  0.797 
  10 points  0.32  0.786  0.0002  0.842 
  11 points  0.06  0.906  0.2328  0.522 
  12 points  0.04  0.378  < 0.0001  0.810 
  13‐14 points  0.04  0.571  0.0004  0.222 
 
   Notes:  (*)  is  the  reference  level. Controlling  for other variables, a driver with seven accumulated 
demerit points who gets a supplementary two point offense has a traffic violation risk reduced by 1 ‐ 
exp  (0.764  ‐  0.974)  =  19%.  As  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  effect  is  increasing  with  adp,  the 
estimated risk reduction due to the incentive effect is greater than 19%. The "p‐values" refer to tests 
for  the null assumption: g₁(7)  ≤ g₁(adp)  (with adp > 7) vs.  the alternative, with one‐sided  rejection 
regions. For instance, the null assumption related to adp = 8 is rejected at the level α if α is greater 
than the "p‐value" 1.3%, and accepted otherwise. The results suggest that g₁ is not increasing beyond 
adp  =  7, which  shows  evidence  of moral  hazard.  A  global  test  for  the  increasing  shape  of  g₁  is 
presented  in  Figure 3. Additional  regression  variables  are:  gender, driver’s  license  class  (9  levels), 
place of residence (16 levels), age of the driver (5 slopes), number of past suspension spells (3 levels), 
as  well  as  calendar  effects  related  to  years  (8  levels),  and  months  (12  levels).  Number  of 
observations:  3,492,868  duration‐event  indicator  pairs,  derived  from  41,290  driver’s  licenses.  The 
durations are bounded above by one month. 
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FIGURE 1.―RELATIVE FREQUENCIES (IN PERCENTAGE) FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS AND 
ACCIDENTS 
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Notes:  Figure  1  represents  relative  frequencies  of  traffic  violations  and  accidents  derived 
from a one‐year centered moving average. The reform introducing the insurance experience 
rating structure based on demerit points took effect on December 1, 1992. 
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FIGURE 2.―TIME EVOLUTION OF TRAFFIC VIOLATION RISK RELATED TO OPTIMAL EFFORT. 
EXAMPLE WITH TWO TRAFFIC OFFENSES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      1 year               t1           t1+1          t1+2           t1+3    t (time) 
 
 
   Notes: The  function  ( )( )→λt e t   is  represented by  the  thick  line.  In  this example,  the  first  traffic 
violation occurs at t1, the second at t1+1. The two demerit points are removed at t1+2 and t1+3. The 
optimal effort level is denoted as  ( )e t . It is determined by all the seniorities of non‐redeemed traffic 
violations,  if  any.  The  minimum  effort  level  is  denoted  as  emin  and  may  be  greater  than  zero, 
depending  on  the  individual  characteristics  of  the  driver.  After  each  traffic  violation,  there  is  an 
upward jump in the optimal effort level and an implied drop in traffic violation risk if incentives are 
effective.  The  continuous  time  effect  of  incentives  counters  the  event‐driven  effect  (i.e.  ( )e t  
decreases with t and  ( )( )λ e t  increases). Before t1, the effort level is minimal. It increases after the 
first traffic violation. The drop in traffic violation risk is the opposite of the unobserved heterogeneity 
effect. The effort is maximum after the second offense, and then we have  ( ) ( )+ = +1 1e t 2 e t 1  at the 
time of the first point removal (one non‐redeemed traffic violation with a one year seniority in both 
cases). We also have  ( )+ =1 mine t 3 e  at the time of the second removal. 
 
( )( )λ e t :  traffic violation risk 
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FIGURE 3.―GLOBAL TEST FOR THE INCREASING SHAPE OF THE TRAFFIC VIOLATION RISK 
AS A FUNCTION OF ACCUMULATED DEMERIT POINTS 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   Notes: This figure presents a graphical test where the null is the weakly increasing shape of g₁ as a 
function of adp, the number of accumulated demerit points. The test statistic  is a squared distance 
between  the  unconstrained  estimation  of  g₁  (thick  line)  given  in  Table  2,  and  the  set  of weakly 
increasing functions of adp. The metric is that of the Wald asymptotic test, and the weakly increasing 
function which is closest to g₁ is represented by the dotted line. The statistic is equal to 43.18 and its 
asymptotic distribution  is less than that of a χ²(13) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. 
This  leads  us  to  reject  the  increasing  shape  assumption  for  every  significance  level  greater  than 
42×10⁻⁶.  As  an  absence  of  incentive  effects  entails  an  increasing  shape  for  g₁  (unobserved 
heterogeneity effect), rejecting the null shows evidence of moral hazard. 
             01gˆ                1gˆ  
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A Appendix
A.1 Incentive e¤ects of point-record drivers licenses: Model
without point removal
The Bellman equation on the expected utility is
un = max
e0
(du e)dt+(exp( rdt) [((1  (e)dt) un) + ((e)dt un+1) + o(dt)]) :
We then obtain
0 = max
e0
(du   e)  (r + (e))un + (e)un+1;
and equation (1).
We give the main properties of the function
c(u) =
def
min
e0
e+ [(e)u] = min
e0
h(u; e) ;
with  a positive, decreasing and strictly convex hazard function. The related
optimal e¤ort level is equal to
eopt(u) = argmin
e0
h(u; e))
eopt(u) = 0 if u   1

0
(0)
; eopt(u) =


0
 1 1
u

if u   1

0
(0)
: (8)
Hence the function c is dened on the real line as the optimal e¤ort. From the
last equation, we obtain
u   1

0
(0)
) c(u) = (0)u; (9)
and c is linear in the neighborhood of 0, which corresponds to no e¤ort. The
function c is strictly increasing because  is strictly positive. If u  0, we
have that:
c(u) = h(u; eopt(u))  eopt(u)) lim
u!+1
c(u)  lim
u!+1
eopt(u) = +1:
1
Hence c is an increasing homeomorphism on the real line.
The function c is concave. From the envelope theorem, we have
h
0
u(u; e) = (e)) c
0
(u) = h
0
u(u; eopt(u)) = (eopt(u)): (10)
Hence c is concave from the assumptions on  and from the properties of eopt.
We give a proof of the increasing property of the optimal e¤ort level as a
function of accumulated demerit points. From equation (1), we obtain
un   un+1 = c 1 (r(umax   un)); umax =
du
r
(0  n < N): (11)
The sequence (un)0nN is decreasing because we have umax  un. Plug-
ging this result into equation (11) implies that the sequence (un   un+1)0n<N
is increasing. The optimal e¤ort level is denoted as en, and expressed as
en = arg min
e0
e+ [(e) (un   un+1)] = eopt(un   un+1);
for 0  n < N , where eopt is dened from (8). As eopt is an increasing function,
the optimal e¤ort is an increasing function of the number of demerit points for
any given value of the license suspension threshold.
Let us specify the condition under which incentives are e¤ective. From
(11) and (9), we obtain
en > 0, un   un+1 = du   run
(0)
>
 1

0
(0)
= u: (12)
If nes are included in the incentives, un+1 is replaced by un+1  fa in equation
(1), which leads to the recurrence equation (see Figure 4)
du   run = c(un   un+1 + fa)
, un+1 = un + fa  c 1 (du   run) = g(un): (13)
The xed point of g is the lifetime driving utility if nes were the only incentive
scheme, i.e. eumax = du   c(fa)
r
:
2
We evidently assume that du > c(fa); i.e. eumax > 0. If the two incentives are
mixed, we have un  eumax and we deduce from (13) the properties of utilities
and of optimal e¤ort levels as functions of n that we obtained in the rst place.
In addition, we have
en > 0 ;8n; , fa+ un   un+1 > u ;8n:
This condition is fullled if
fa > u =  1=0(0);
in which case the incentives are e¤ective at every level.
A.2 Incentive e¤ects of point-record drivers licenses: Model
with point removal
The Bellman equation on a holistic incentive model can be written as follows
du   ru(S) +

d
dt
[u(St)]

t=0+
= c(fa+ u(S)  E [u(TR(S))]): (14)
The state variables S are the seniorities of each non-redeemed tra¢ c o¤ense (if
any), the related demerit points and the seniority of the last contract anniversary
if the premium is included in the incentives. The related lifetime utility is u(S).
The state St is reached from S with an eventless history (no tra¢ c o¤ense, point
removal or contract anniversary) of duration t. The parameters du and fa are
the driving utility ow and the average ne, and E [u(TR(S))] is the lifetime
utility averaged with transition probabilities on the state(s) reached from S after
a tra¢ c o¤ense. Continuity equations on utility at the time of a point removal
or of a contract anniversary (in the latter case, the increase in lifetime utility
is equal to the disutility of the premium) and the equation linking the utility
of a beginner and the utility just after a license suspension dene the solution
together with equation (14).
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Let us prove the continuity of optimal e¤ort after a point removal in a sys-
tem where each tra¢ c violation is redeemed beyond a given seniority threshold,
equal to T . We suppose that each tra¢ c violation is associated with one demerit
point, and that incentives are related to nes and to the point-record drivers
license. The state variables are then the seniorities of each non-redeemed tra¢ c
o¤ense, if any. Let us denote these variables as
S = (t1; : : : ; tn); 0  t1 < : : : < tn < T:
The corresponding optimal e¤ort is denoted as e(S). The states reached without
tra¢ c o¤ense before the next point removal are then
St = (t1 + t; : : : ; tn + t); 0  t < T   tn:
We denote the state reached from S after an additional tra¢ c o¤ense (if n < N)
as (0; t1; : : : ; tn) = TR(S): As the lifetime utility is continuous after a point
removal, we have the following result:
n  1 : lim
t!(T tn) 
u(St) = u(S
R); SR = (t1 + T   tn; : : : ; tn 1 + T   tn):
The state SR is reached from S if there is no tra¢ c o¤ense before the rst point
removal. Then it is easily seen that
lim
t!(T tn) 
u [TR(St)] = u

TR(SR)

= u(0; t1 + T   tn; : : : ; tn 1 + T   tn):
This means that the left continuity at T   tn of the map t ! u(St) also holds
for the map t ! u [TR(St)] ; which is associated with the states reached after
an additional tra¢ c o¤ense. The reason is that removal of past o¤enses occurs
regardless of the future individual history.
From the three last equations, we obtain
lim
t!(T tn) 
e(St) = e(S
R)
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and the continuity property of the optimal e¤ort level. Since we expect a global
increasing link between optimal e¤ort and the accumulated demerit points, the
time-e¤ect should be decreasing globally in order to fulll this continuity prop-
erty.
A.3 Incentive e¤ects of the experience rating system
Let us derive the Bellman equation on the expected disutility function given in
(15), including an average ne of faj for a j demerit point tra¢ c violation. The
optimal disutility function is obtained from the program
vn(t) = min
e0
edt+ (exp( rdt) (1  (e)dt) vn(t+ dt))
+
0@exp( rdt)
24 X
j = fj>0
fj (e)dt

vmin(n+j;N)(t+ dt) + faj
351A+ o(dt);
which leads to
0 = v
0
n(t) + c
0@fa+
0@ X
j = fj>0
fj vmin(n+j;N)(t)
1A  vn(t)
1A  rvn(t);
with fa =
P
j = fj>0
fj  faj the average ne. Then we obtain the Bellman
equation
v
0
n(t) = rvn(t)  c
 
fa+vn(t)

; (0  n  N): (15)
The argument of c; fa+vn(t); is the incentive level.
A.4 Test for the increasing shape of a vector of parame-
ters, and for evidence of moral hazard
Let  be the vector of values reached by the function g1; where g1 is dened in
equation (7). We have adp = g1(adp); 1  adp  13; with adp the number
of demerit points accumulated in the last two years. In what follows,  can be
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replaced by g1, but we use here the usual notations for asymptotic tests. The
level adp = 13 also includes the 14 point total. As adp = 0 is the default level
in the regression, the increasing shape of g1 is related to the null assumption
g1(0) = 0  1  : : :  13: (16)
Rejecting this assumption amounts to nding evidence of moral hazard. The
null assumption is obviously expressed as a set of inequalities of the type fi() 
0 (i = 1; : : : ; 13); with
f() = vec
i
(fi()) = J  ; J
13;13
=
0BBBBBBBB@
1 0 : : : : : : 0
 1 1 . . . 0 ...
0
. . . . . . . . .
...
... 0
. . . 1 0
0 : : : 0  1 1
1CCCCCCCCA
:
A usual asymptotic test for the nullity of f() derived from b; the maximum
likelihood estimation (m.l.e.) of  estimated here together with nuisance pa-
rameters is the Wald test. The related statistic writes as follows
W = jjf(b)jj2M = d2M(f(b); 0); M = bV hf(b)i 1 = hJf (b) bV (b) tJf (b)i 1 ;
where Jf (b) is the Jacobian of f (Jf (b) = J as f is linear), and where bV (b) is
derived from the asymptotic e¢ ciency of the m.l.e. Under the null, the Wald
statistic follows a 2(13) distribution asymptotically. The null (i.e. f() = 0,
 = 0 as f is one-to-one; as J is invertible, we have W = jjbjj2
[bV (b)] 1) is rejected
from our data at every usual level, as W = 1933:12.
The increasing shape of g1 is the null to be tested for with inequalities,
and is expressed as follows
H0 : fi()  0 8i = 1; : : : ; 13, f() 2 O+;
where O+ is the positive orthant of R13. In order to test for H0 against the
alternative, a natural statistic derived from the Wald test uses the distance
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between the unconstrained estimation of positivity constraints and the positive
orthant, i.e.
W+ = d2M(f(
b); O+) = min
z2O+
jjf(b)  zjj2M = jjf(b)  z0jj2M ; z0 = PO+(f(b)):
The metric M was already used for the Wald statistic. As 0 belongs to the
positive orthant, we have W+  W . The derivation of the projection PO+(f(b))
of f(b) on the positive orthant O+ can be seen numerically as a quadratic pro-
gramming problem. As this projection belongs to the frontier of the positive
orthant, the issue is to nd the set of coordinates that are strictly positive.
The asymptotic properties of the statisticW+ under the null are described
by Wolak (1991). The statistic is not asymptotically distribution free under the
null, as is the case in the equality setting. The limit distribution is a mixture of
2(i) distributions (0  i  13), where 2(0) is the unit mass (Dirac) at zero.
If f() belongs to the interior of O+, the limit distribution of W+ is obviously
equal to 2(0), due to the pointwise convergence of f(b) towards f(). Otherwise
the weights of the mixture depend on the position of f() at the frontier of the
positive orthant. As a 2(i+1) variable is obtained as the sum of a 2(i) variable
and of a nonnegative variable, the 2(i) distributions increase with i in the sense
of rst order stochastic dominance. Then all the limit distributions of W+ will
be rst order-dominated by a 2(13) distribution, owing to their denition as
mixtures. This result is also simply obtained from the inequality W+  W .
On our data, the projection PO+(f(b)) is found equal to the projection of
f(b) = J  b on the subspace of R13 dened by fz 2 R13 = z7 = : : : = z13 = 0g.
We have: PO+(f(b)) = f(b0)) b0 = J 1  hPO+(J  b)i, with
tb =  0:311 0:500 0:522 0:794 0:854 0:873 0:974 ::::::: 0:571  ;
tb0 =  0:312 0:500 0:523 0:795 0:855 0:870 0:870 ::::::: 0:870  ;
The missing components of b can be found in Table 2, and we have b06 = : : : = b013.
Hence b0 is the vector of parameters with a weakly increasing shape that is the
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closest to our estimation with respect to the metric tJMJ = [bV (b)] 1. Both
vectors are represented in Figure 3 (with  replaced by g1). From our data, the
statistic W+ is equal to
W+ = jjf(b)  f(b0)jj2M = jjb   b0jj2[bV (b)] 1 = 43:18;
The statistic W+ is a squared distance between the unconstrained estimation
of g1 and the set of weakly increasing functions of adp. If F is the distribution
function of a 2(13) variable, we have that F (43:18) = 0:999958: If the null
assumption: f() 2 O+ is tested for with rejection regions of the type [W+ >
a], it will be rejected at any signicance level greater than 1   0:999958 =
4210 6. To see this, it is enough to apply the rst order stochastic dominance
property given before. Then the increasing shape of g1 is rejected at every usual
signicance level, which shows evidence of moral hazard.
A.5 Elasticity between the optimal frequency risk and
the incentive level
We relate the shape of  and the elasticity between optimal frequency risk and
the incentive level. Let us perform a local expansion around a value u0 of
the incentive level, in a situation where the incentives are e¤ective (i.e. u0 >
u =  1=0(0)). If we write
e0 = eopt(u
0); e0 + de = eopt(u
0 + du);
the equations
1 + 
0
(e0)u0 = 0; 1 +
h

0
(e0 + de)
 
u0 + du
i
= 0
lead to
de =
 0(e0)

00
(e0)u0
du+ o (du) ;
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and to
d
(e0)
=

0
(e0)
(e0)
de =
h
 0(e0)
i2
(e0) 00(e0) 
du
u0
:
Hence the aforementioned elasticity is equal to


0
2
=
00
. Now we have that
(log )
00
=

00

 
 

0

!2
=

00

0B@1 +


0
2

00
1CA :
Then the conclusions given in Section 4.2 are easily obtained.
A.6 Monetary equivalents of tra¢ c violations
Let us suppose that the increase in the argument of c is close to 12% after a
tra¢ c violation. This is the value retained in Section 4.2 for a driver with seven
demerit points accumulated, which corresponds to n = 3 tra¢ c violations on
average. As the argument of c in the model without point removal and with
nes is equal to fa+ un   un+1 (see equation 13) we have that
fa+ un+1   un+2 = 1:12
 
fa+ un   un+1

: (17)
We shall compare the utility losses un+1 un+2 and un un+1 from the recurrence
equation on lifetime utility, and obtain a monetary equivalent of an additional
tra¢ c violation from a derivation of the utility loss un   un+1. We have
un+1 = g(un); g(u) = fa+ u  c 1 (du   ru)
(see Figure 4). From the equality c
0
(u) = (eopt(u)) (see equation (10)), we
obtain
g
0
(un) = 1 +
r
n
; n = (eopt(fa+ un   un+1)):
The parameter n is the frequency risk corresponding to the optimal e¤ort ex-
erted with n tra¢ c violations accumulated. As n decrease with n, we have
that
1 +
r
n
 un+1   un+2
un   un+1 =
g(un)  g(un+1)
un   un+1  1 +
r
n+1
: (18)
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From equations (17) and (18), we obtain
r

0
n
  0:12

 (un   un+1) = 0:12 fa = 15:6 $; n+1  0n  n:
The monetary equivalent of an additional tra¢ c violation is then bounded as
follows:
, 15:6 $r
n+1
  0:12  un   un+1 
15:6 $
r
n
  0:12 :
Section 4.2 provides numerical examples with n = 0:15; n+1 = 0:12. The
monetary cost of a license suspension follows from a sum of the items related to
tra¢ c violations and from the inequalities given in (18).
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Figure 4
Recurrence equation on the lifetime utility function
Point-record drivers license without nes: u0n+1 = f(u
0
n)
Point-record drivers license with nes: un+1 = g(un)
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umax = du=ruun
un+1 = g(un)
umax
f(u) = u  c 1 (r(umax   u)); g(u) = f(u) + fa:
E¤ective incentives condition with and without nes
en > 0, un < u = umax

1 +
(0)

0
(0) du

:
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